Non-deterministic semantics for quantum states by Juan Pablo, Jorge & Holik, Federico
Non-deterministic semantics for quantum states
Juan Pablo Jorge1 and Federico Holik2
February 2019
1- Physics Department, University of Buenos Aires, CABA (1428), Argentina;
jorgejpablo@gmail.com
2- Instituto de F´ısica La Plata, La Plata (1900), Buenos Aires, Argentina;
olentiev2@gamail.com
Abstract
In this work, we discuss the failure of the principle of truth function-
ality in the quantum formalism. By exploiting this failure, we import
the formalism of N-matrix theory and non-deterministic semantics to the
foundations of quantum mechanics. This is done by describing quantum
states as particular valuations associated with infinite non-deterministic
truth tables. This allows us to introduce a natural interpretation of quan-
tum states in terms of a non-deterministic semantics. We also provide
a similar construction for arbitrary probabilistic theories based in ortho-
modular lattices, allowing to study post-quantum models using logical
techniques.
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1 Introduction
According to the principle of truth-functionality or composability (TFP), the
truth-value of a complex formula is uniquely determined by the truth-values of
its subformulas. It is a basic principle of logic. However, as explained in [1],
many real-world situations involve dealing with information that is incomplete,
vague or uncertain. This is especially true for quantum phenomena, where
only probabilistic assertions about possible events can be tested in the lab.
These situations pose a threat to the application of logical systems obeying the
principle of truth-functionality in those problems. As is well known, the TFP
fails in many logical systems of interest (see examples in [2]).
One possible way to deal with this situation is to relax the TFP. This is
the path followed in [3], where the idea of non-deterministic computations—
borrowed from automata and computability theory—is applied to evaluations
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of truth-values of formulas. This leads to the introduction of non-deterministic
matrices (N-matrices). These are a natural generalization of ordinary multi-
valued matrices, in which the truth-value of a complex formula can be chosen
non-deterministically, out of some non-empty set of options [1, 3, 4, 5].
The Kochen-Specker theorem [6] is one of the most fundamental no-go theo-
rems of quantum mechanics, and it holds in many probabilistic models of interest
[7, 8, 9]. It has far-reaching consequences for the interpretation of the quantum
formalism (see for example [10]). In particular, it imposes very strong restric-
tions on the possible physically motivated valuations that can be defined over
the propositions associated with quantum models. In this work, we discuss in
which sense the principle of truth functionality is false in the quantum formalism
and describe how N-matrices can be used to describe quantum states and quan-
tum state spaces. This novel perspective opens the door to new fundamental
questions by introducing the possibility of interpreting quantum probabilities
as a particular class of non-classical valuations.
We also extend our approach to a family of generalized probabilistic models—
including quantum and classical probabilistic ones as particular cases. The N-
matrices associated with classical probabilistic models are non-deterministic,
but they always admit global classical valuations to the set {0, 1}. These global
valuations will not exist, in general, for non-classical probabilistic models. The
study of post-quantum theories is a very active field of research nowadays, since
it provides an extraordinary ground for studying the fundamental principles
that underly the quantum formalism (see, for example, [11, 12, 13]). Further-
more, the study of contextual systems outside the quantum domain [14, 15, 16]
poses the question of looking for contextual models which are non-quantum,
but non-classical either. Furthermore, non-standard probabilities have been
used to describe the deviations of classical logic in decision-making problems.
As an example, negative probabilities have been applied to the study of incon-
sistent judgments [17]. Our extension could be useful for studying contextuality
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22] in quantum mechanics and generalized probabilistic models
from a novel logical perspective.
The logic-operational approach to quantum theory dates back to the 1930s,
after the contribution of Birkhoff and von Neumann [23] (for further develop-
ments of the quantum logical approach, see [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38]). More recently, a growing interest is put in describing
logical structures associated to quantum computation [39, 40, 41, 42].
In this work, we give an interesting turn to the quantum logical approach
by introducing a relatively recently discovered logical technique into the foun-
dations of quantum mechanics. As a result of our construction, we show that a
quantum logical entailment arises by appealing to the quantum non-deterministic
semantics. This is a step forward in the discussion whether there exists a well-
behaved logic associated with the quantum formalism.
The paper is organized as follows. We start by reviewing the principle of
truth functionality in classical logics in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we discuss
the Born rule and the Kochen-Specker and Gleason’s theorems from a quantum
logical perspective. There, we discuss in which sense the principle of truth
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functionality is not valid in quantum mechanics. In Section 4, we review the
formalism of N-matrix theory and non-deterministic semantics. In Section 5 we
show how this formalism can be used to describe quantum states, as a particular
set of valuations associated with infinite truth tables, that we first introduced
here. We also discuss extensions to generalized probabilistic models and the
detection of probabilities with finite precision. In Section 6 we discuss the
possibility of developing a logical consequence in quantum logic. Finally, in
Section 7, we draw our conclusions.
2 The Principle of Truth Functionality and Al-
gebra Homomorphisms
In this section, we review the principle of truth functionality, in connection
with the notion of classical semantics and algebra homomorphisms. The reader
with a background in algebra and logic, may skip this section. We focus on the
homomorphisms between a given algebra and the two-element Boolean algebra
B2 = {0, 1}, endowed with the usual operations (that we denote by ∨˜, ∧˜,
and ¬˜). The principle of truth functionality is very important for our work,
because the KS theorem is expressed in terms of classical valuations satisfying
a functional behavior with respect to truth-value assignments. We also discuss,
in the following, how non-deterministic semantics can be used to deal with the
failure of the TFP, and how they offer the possibility of understanding the
consequences of the KS theorem under a new light.
In this section, we follow the treatment given in references [43, 44]. Let us
start with a definition of algebra that is relevant to our logical approach:
Definition 2.1. A type of algebras is a set F of function symbols, where each
symbol f ∈ F has associated a natural number n, its arity.
Definition 2.2. Given a type F of algebras, an algebra of type F is a pair
A = 〈A,F 〉, where A is a set and F = (fAi )i∈I is a family of operations over
A, defined in such a way that, to each symbol of F of arity n, it corresponds
an n-ary operation fAi . The set A is the universe associated with the algebra.
Usually, one speaks about the algebra by referring to its universe only, in case
that the operations are clearly understood from the context. We also write fi
instead of fAi , where no confusion can arise.
As an example, consider the algebra B2. Its universe is the set {0, 1} and
its operations are given by ∨˜, ∧˜ and ¬˜, with arity 2, 2 and 1, respectively.
2.1 Homomorphisms
A homomorphism between algebras is defined as follows:
Definition 2.3. Let A=〈A,F 〉 and B = 〈B,G〉 be algebras of the same type
and let h : A → B be a function. The map h is a homomorphism from a A to
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B, if for any of n-ary symbol fA ∈ F we have that, for every n-tuple (a1, ..., an)
of elements in A:
h(fA(a1,...,an)) = f
B
(h(a1),...,h(an))
being fB the operation in B which corresponds to fA in A.
If a homomorphism h is a bijection, it is called an isomorphism.
Each propositional language and its well-formed formulas are defined by the
set of connectives, whenever there is a denumerable set of propositional variables
and punctuation symbols (under the assumption that we have recursive rules for
their formation). Thus, a type is assigned to each language, in the same way as
it occurs for algebras. For more discussion about this, we refer the reader to [45].
In order to illustrate these ideas, let us consider the implicational propositional
calculus. The only connective of this calculus is “→”, which is binary. Thus,
each formula which is not a variable is of the form a → b. This is a type 〈2〉
language. The classical propositional calculus with its connectives “¬”, “∨”,
“∧” and “→”, is of the type 〈1, 2, 2, 2〉.
We can evaluate the formulas of a language L in algebras of the same type,
proceeding similarly as with homomorphisms between algebras. Valuations are
defined in such a way that each n-ary connective is transformed into a corre-
sponding n-ary operation. Valuations assign to each formula of the language an
element of an algebra, that we may think of as its truth-value. In the classical
case, this algebra is B2, and 0 and 1 are identified as the values “true” and
“false”, respectively. In the classical propositional calculus, this construction
gives place to the well-known truth tables.
At this point, some readers might be interested in understanding with more
detail the link between the type of a language and a type of algebra. For self
completeness, we have included section 2.1.1 below, in which we explain these
notions with more detail.
We now give the definition of valuation for a propositional language:
Definition 2.4. Let L be a propositional language whose set of connectives
is (ci)i∈I and let 〈A,G〉 be an algebra where G = (gi)i∈I . A (deterministic)
valuation is a function v : L → A, such that for each n-ary connective c and
formulas B1, ...Bn, it satisfies
v(c(B1, ..., Bn)) = g
c(v(B1), ..., v(Bn)),
being gc the n-ary operation in A corresponding to c.
From the above definition of classical valuation, it follows that the value
of gc(v(B1), ..., v(Bn)) is determined by the values v(B1),....,v(Bn), that the
valuation v assigns to the propositions B1,....,Bn out of which the formula
c(B1, ..., Bn) is composed. This is the exact content of the principle of truth
functionality. A truth functional operator is an operator whose values are de-
termined by those of its components. All classical operators are truth-functional.
Accordingly, classical propositional logic is a truth-functional propositional logic.
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In classical propositional logic the algebra is given by B2. Thus, for exam-
ple, the value v(P ∨ Q) assigned by a classical valuation v to the compound
proposition P ∨ Q is determined solely by the values v(P ) and v(Q). In other
words, we have v(P ∨ Q) = v(P )∨˜v(Q). Similar examples can be given for ∧˜
and ¬˜. In Section 3 we see how these notions can be extended to the quantum
formalism.
2.1.1 Types of Languages and Homomorphisms between Structures
For a detailed treatment of the content of this section, see [45]. Let us start
with the definition of type:
Definition 2.5. A type (or signature) is a set τ of symbols which has the form:
τ = (
⋃
1≤n
Rn) ∪ (
⋃
1≤m
Fm) ∪ C,
where Rn is a set of relational n-arity symbols, Fm is a set of m-arity functional
symbols and C is a set of symbols for constants (or any other distinguished
symbols of the system), which are referred as 0-arity functions.
The relational and functional symbols acquire meaning only when they are
considered in connection with a semantics or an interpretation. Thus, they are
interpreted as relations, functions and distinguished elements, respectively, in a
given universe of interpretation. It is necessary to define a language of a given
type in order to apply the definitions of valuation and homomorphism, and then,
to relate the notion of language with that of algebra (or structure in the more
general case).
In this work, we will restrict ourselves to the propositional calculus only. We
include here the definition of first-order languages, because it can be useful for
the development of quantum-inspired languages.
Definition 2.6. The symbols for building expressions of a language of type
τ—that we denote by Lτ—are the following:
1. Individual variables: v0, v1, ..., vn, ....
2. Auxiliary symbols: left and right parenthesis, and commas.
3. Propositional connectives: ¬, ∨, ∧, →,...
4. Equality symbol: =.
5. Existential quantifier: ∃.
6. The symbols of τ .
The symbols contained in 1 to 4 above are usually referred to as the canonical
interpretation and are called logical symbols; the symbols contained in 5 and 6
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may have a variable interpretation, and are called non-logical symbols. This is
the reason why τ determines the type of language.
Some remarks are in order. In the quantum formalism, a natural choice
is to consider the orthogonal projections as individual variables. In classical
logic, it is usual to work with only two connectives, as for example, ¬ and
∨, and to define the rest of the connectives as a function of them. This is
usual in proof theory to simplify the object language. The possibility of doing
this simplification depends on the specific properties of the given language (i.e.,
connectives are not always inter-definable). In this work, we will restrict the
use to ∨, ¬ and ∧. Regarding point 4 above: languages containing this symbol
are called languages with an equality. Regarding 5: we will not use quantifiers
in this work for the quantum case.
Now we give the standard definitions of terms, expressions and formulas.
Definition 2.7. Let τ be a type. An expression of type τ , or a τ -expression, is
a finite sequence of symbols of Lτ .
Definition 2.8. The set of terms of type τ , or τ -terms, is the least set X of
τ -expressions satisfying:
• {vi : i ≥ 0} ∪ C ⊆ X, where C ⊆ τ , is the set of constants of τ .
• If f ∈ Fm ⊆ τ , 1 ≤ m and t1, ..., tm ∈ X, then f(t1, ..., tm) ∈ X.
Definition 2.9. A τ -formula is atomic if it is an expression of the form:
(t1 = t2) or P (t1, ..., tn), where t1, ..., tn are τ -terms and P ∈ Rn ⊆ τ .
Definition 2.10. The set of formulas of type τ is the least set X of τ -expressions,
such that:
• {α : α is an atomic τ -formula} ⊆ X.
• If α, β ∈ X, then (¬α), (α ∨ β), (α ∧ β) and (α→ β) ∈ X.
• If α ∈ X and vi is a variable, then (∃viα) ∈ X.
Definition 2.11. A τ -interpretation (or τ -structure) for a language L is a pair
U = 〈A, I〉, where:
• A 6= ∅.
• I : τ → A ∪ {f : Am → A, 1 ≤ m} ∪ (⋃{P (An) : 1 ≤ n}).
P (An) denotes the power set of An, and such that for any x ∈ τ :
If x ∈ Rn, then I(x) = xU ⊆ An.
If x ∈ Fm, then I(x) = xU : Am → A.
If x ∈ C, then I(x) = xU ∈ A.
I is the interpretation function of U over the universe A.
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Usually, if τ = {x1, ..., xn}, we denote the structure U = 〈A, I〉 as follows:
U = 〈A, xU1 , ..., xUn 〉
In our case, where the language is formed by projection operators acting on
a Hilbert space endowed with their respective connectives, the structure U will
have a universe A and interpretations for the connectives, which are symbols of
functions. In such a structure there will be no interpreted relation symbols. For
this reason, the structure associated with our language is an algebra (and not a
more general structure), and we can relate it with algebras of the same type as
we did in defining valuations and homomorphisms for the language of our type.
Definition 2.12. Let U = 〈A, I〉 and V = 〈B, J〉 be two τ -structures. Then, h
is a homomorphism from U to V if, and only if:
• h is a function from A to B; h : A→ B.
• For each relational n-ary symbol rn in τ and each a1, ..., an ∈ A,
〈a1, ..., an〉 ∈ rUn iff 〈h(a1), ..., h(an)〉 ∈ rVn .
• For each functional n-ary symbol fn in τ and each a1, ..., an ∈ A,
h(fUn (a1, ..., an)) = f
V
n (h(a1), ..., h(an)).
• For each c ∈ τ, h(cU) = cV.
It can be seen how this definition for homomorphisms between structures
generalizes the one that we gave for a homomorphism between algebras. This
is a consequence of the fact that we are dealing with a language of type τ that
only has function symbols (which are the connectives of our language).
3 Quantum States and the Gleason and Kochen–
Specker Theorems
In this section, we review two of the most important results in the foundations
of quantum mechanics: Gleason [46, 47] and Kochen–Specker [6, 8, 9] theorems.
The fundamental properties underlying these theorems will play a key role in
the rest of the paper. We discuss truth functionality in the quantum domain.
3.1 Quantum Probabilities and Gleason’S Theorem
An elementary experiment associated with a quantum system is given by a
yes-no test, i.e., a test in which we get the answer “yes” or the answer “no”
[27]. As is well known, elementary tests associated with quantum systems are
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represented by orthogonal projections acting on a separable Hilbert space H.
An operator P ∈ B(H) is said to be an orthogonal projection if it satisfies
P 2 = P and P = P ∗. (1)
Let P(H) denote the set of all orthogonal projections acting on H. De-
note by B(H) the set of bounded operators acting on H. Projectors and
closed subspaces can be put in a one to one correspondence, by assigning to
each orthogonal projection its image. Thus, they can be considered as inter-
changeable notions (and we will use them interchangeably in the following).
The set P(H) can be endowed with an orthocomplemented lattice structure
L(H) = 〈P(H), ∧, ∨, ¬, 0, 1〉, where P ∧ Q is the orthogonal projection
associated to intersection of the ranges of P and Q, P ∨ Q is the orthogonal
projection associated with the closure of the direct sum of the ranges of P and
Q, 0 is the null operator (the bottom element of the lattice), 1 is the identity
operator (the top element), and ¬(P ) is the orthogonal projection associated
with the orthogonal complement of the range of P [31]. It is important to re-
mark that the symbol “L(H)” denotes the collection of orthogonal projections
of H and it should not be confused with the set of linear operators acting on it.
This lattice (which is equivalent to that of closed subspaces of H) was discov-
ered by Birkhoff and von Neumann, who coined the term Quantum Logic [23].
The main characteristic of this quantum structure is that it is a non-Boolean
lattice. It is always modular in the finite-dimensional case and never modular
in the infinite one [31].
Any observable quantity can be represented by a self-adjoint operator. For
every self-adjoint operator A, if the system is prepared in state ρ, its mean value
is given by the formula:
〈A〉 = tr(ρA). (2)
Due to the spectral theorem, self-adjoint operators are in one to one corre-
spondence with projective valued measures (PVM) [48]. Let B be the Borel set
of the real line. Given a self-adjoint operator A, its projection-valued measure
MA is a map [31]:
MA : B 7→ P(H), (3)
such that
1. MA(∅) = 0
2. MA(R) = 1
3. MA(∪j(Bj)) =
∑
jMA(Bj), for any mutually disjoint family Bj
4. MA(B
c) = 1−MA(B) = (MA(B))⊥.
In quantum mechanics, states can be considered as functions that assign
probabilities to the elements of L(H). A state on a quantum system is repre-
sented by a function:
µ : L(H) −→ [0, 1] (4)
satisfying:
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1. µ(0) = 0.
2. µ(P⊥) = 1− µ(P )
3. For any pairwise orthogonal and denumerable family {Pj}j∈N, µ(
∨
j Pj) =∑
j µ(Pj).
Gleason’s theorem [46, 47] is equivalent to the assertion that whenever
dim(H) ≥ 3, the set C(L(H)) of all measures of the form (4) can be put in
a one to one correspondence with the set S(H) of all positive and trace-class
operators of trace one acting in H. The correspondence is such that for every
measure µ satisfying the above axioms, there exists a density operator ρµ ∈ S(H)
such that for every orthogonal projector P representing an elementary test, we
have:
µ(P ) = tr(ρµP ). (5)
It will be important for us to recall how probabilities are defined in a classical
setting. Thus, given a set Ω, let us consider a σ-algebra Σ ⊆ P(Ω) of subsets.
Then, a Kolmogorovian probability measure will be given by a function
µ : Σ→ [0, 1] (6)
satisfying
1. µ(∅) = 0
2. µ(Ac) = 1− µ(A), where (. . .)c denotes set theoretical complement
3. for any pairwise disjoint and denumerable family {Ai}i∈N, µ(
⋃
iAi) =∑
i µ(Ai).
The above conditions (6) are known as Kolmogorov’s axioms [49] and are
very useful for theoretical purposes. The main difference between classical and
quantum probabilities—pass their similitude in shape—comes from the fact
that the σ-algebra Σ appearing in (6) is Boolean, while L(H) is not. This
is the reason why quantum probabilities are also called non-Kolmogorovian (or
non-Boolean) probability measures (for more discussion on this subject, see for
example [50, 51, 52, 53]; for the connection between quantum probabilities and
quantum information theory, see [54, 55]).
The lattice L(H) of closed subspaces (or equivalently, orthogonal projec-
tions) of a separable Hilbert space and the Boolean algebras (such as those
appearing in 6), are all examples of the more general family of orthomodular
lattices [56]. A lattice L is said to be orthomodular (or weak modular) if it
is orthocomplemented and, whenever x ≤ y, then y = x ∨ (y ∧ x⊥). It turns
out that the orthogonal projections associated to a von Neumann algebra form
an orthomodular lattice [31]. Von Neumann algebras play a key role in the
rigorous treatment of quantum systems with infinitely many degrees of freedom
[51]. Boolean algebras—such as those appearing in 6—are particular cases of
orthomodular lattices. Thus, we can conceive the state of a general physical
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system described by a measure over an arbitrary complete orthomodular lattice
L as follows:
µ : L→ [0, 1] (7)
which satisfies
1. µ(0) = 0
2. µ(a⊥) = 1− µ(a), where (. . .)⊥ denotes the orthocomplement
3. for any pairwise orthogonal and denumerable family of elements {ai}i∈I ,
µ(
∨
i ai) =
∑
i µ(ai).
When L is Boolean, we obtain a classical probabilistic model. The lattice
L(H) is a particular case among a vast family of alternative models of physical
systems.
As a consequence of the orthomodular law, it trivially follows that for every
p, q ∈ L and every state µ, we have p∧ q ≤ p⇒ µ(p∧ q) ≤ µ(p) and p ≤ p∨ q ⇒
µ(p) ≤ µ(p ∨ q). These simple inequalities will be used in sections 5 in order to
build N-matrices for quantum and generalized probabilistic models.
To finish this section, let us recall an important property of orthomodular
lattices that are useful to keep in mind in the following. Any orthomodular
lattice—even if it is non-Boolean—possesses Boolean subalgebras [56]. A state
defined by Equations (7), when restricted to a maximal Boolean subalgebra,
defines a Kolmogorovian probability measure satisfying (6). Moreover, in the
quantum formalism, a maximal observable A defines a maximal Boolean subal-
gebra BA ⊆ L(H), which is given by the range of MA [27].
3.2 The Kochen–Specker Theorem and the Failure of Truth
Functionality in Quantum Mechanics
The Kochen–Specker theorem is one of the cornerstones in the foundations of
quantum mechanics literature [6]. Kochen and Specker were looking for a de-
scription of quantum mechanics in terms of hidden variables, taking as a model
the relationship between classical statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. It
turns out that this hidden variable theory cannot exist for the quantum case.
In order to understand the mathematical structures behind the KS theorem, let
us define first:
Definition 3.1. A classically truth-valued function, is a function v : L(H) −→
{0, 1} having the property that ∑i v(Pi) = 1 for any family {Pi}i∈N of one
dimensional orthogonal elements of L(H) satisfying
∑
i Pi = 1.
The no-go theorem for the hidden variables described in the KS paper is
equivalent to the following statement [6].
Proposition 3.2. There exists no classically truth-valued function.
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In order to understand what the KS theorem says from a logical point of
view, let us see how the notion of truth functionality can be conceived in the
quantum domain. Let us identify the quantum language with that of the lattice
structure L(H) = 〈P(H),∨,∧,¬,0,1〉. It is clear that we can form, recursively,
new propositions out of any given set of propositions in the usual way (i.e.,
consider all possible finite expressions such as (P ∨ Q) ∧ R, (¬P ∧ Q), and so
on). If we want to recreate the notion of classical valuation in quantum theory,
there should exist a set of functions v : L(H) −→ {0, 1} assigning truth values
to all possible elementary propositions. In this way, we would have that, given a
quantum system prepared in a particular state, all of its properties should satisfy
being true or false, and there should be no other possibility. From the physical
point of view, there are several extra conditions to be imposed on these classical
valuations. For example, if no other restrictions are imposed, one can have the
valuation v(P ) = 0 for all P , which is nonsensical because it would imply that
all outcomes will have zero probability of occurrence in any experiment. Which
restrictions are to be imposed? We need to define a set of conditions in order
to discard the non-physical valuations.
According to the probabilistic rules of quantum mechanics (and any phys-
ically consistent theory), if proposition P is true (i.e., if v(P ) = 1), then, any
other proposition Q satisfying Q ≤ P⊥ should be false (v(Q) = 0). This follows
directly from the definition of quantum state: if P is true, its probability of
occurrence is equal to one, and the probability of occurrence of any orthogonal
property will be automatically zero (this follows directly from Equation (4); a
similar conclusion holds in generalized models by using Equation (7)).
Another condition to be imposed in order to obtain properly classical valua-
tions, should be that of being an algebra homomorphism between L(H) and the
two-element Boolean algebra B2 = {0, 1} (see definition 2.3). Thus, for every
P and every family {Pi}ni=1, in analogy with the principle of truth functionality
given by definition 2.4, we should have:
v(
∨
i
Pi) =
∨˜
i
v(Pi) (8)
v(
∧
i
Pi) =
∧˜
i
v(Pi) (9)
v(¬P ) = ¬˜v(P ) = 1− v(P ) (10)
We call classical admissible valuations (and denote it by CAV ) the set of
two-valued functions satisfying Equations (8)–(10). Notice that, if the set of ad-
missible valuations is assumed to be CAV , truth-functionality is automatically
satisfied.
The condition represented by Equation (10) implies that for a denumerable
orthonormal and complete set of projections Pi (i.e.,
∑
i Pi = 1, PiPj = 0 and
dim(Pi) = 1), if v(Pi0) = 1 for some i0, then, v(Pj) = 0, for all j 6= i0 (this
follows from the fact that for j 6= i0, Pj ≤ 1− Pi0). Given that
∑
i Pi = 1, we
must have v(Pi0) = 1, for some i0 (this follows from v(1) = 1 and Equation (8)).
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This is a very reasonable physical property. It implies that, if an experiment
is performed on the system (remember that any denumerable orthonormal and
complete set of one-dimensional projections defines an experiment), we obtain
that one, and only one projection operator is assigned the value 1, while all
other outcomes (which define exclusive events), are assigned the value 0. Notice
that this is the condition of KS (i.e., the condition appearing in definition 3.1).
It is important to remark that an experiment in which all propositions are
assigned the value false, or an experiment in which more than one exclusive
alternatives are assigned the value true, are physically nonsensical. In the latter
case, we would obtain that two mutually exclusive alternatives would occur
with complete certainty. In the former, we would reach a situation in which all
outcomes of an experiment is false. From the perspective of a classical ontology,
these alternatives should be discarded.
We have seen above that any admissible valuation in CAV should satisfy
definition 3.1. The existence of such functions is strictly forbidden by the KS
theorem. It follows that two-valued functions satisfying both, physically reason-
able requirements and truth functionality, cannot exist in the quantum domain.
This will be naturally true for arbitrary probabilistic models, provided that
their propositional structures satisfy the KS theorem (and this is quite true for
a huge family of models [7, 8, 9]). Notice that the KS argument works for Hilbert
spaces of dimension greater than or equal to 3. A simple check also shows that
no element in CAV exists for a qubit system (i.e., a two-dimensional quantum
model). This is so because conditions (8)–(10) are even stronger than those
involved in definition 3.1.
What about weaker conditions? Perhaps, if we give up some physical consid-
erations and focus only on pure mathematics, we might find a set of admissible
functions with regard to which the connectives behave truth functionally. In
[57], Friedman, and Glymour study which are the most reasonable conditions to
be imposed on the set of admissible valuations. After discarding non-physical
possibilities, they end up with the conditions:
v : P(H) −→ {0, 1} is an admissible valuation iff
• for every P , v(P ) = 1 iff v(¬P ) = 0
• for every pair P,Q ∈ P(H), if v(P ) = 1 and P ≤ Q, then v(Q) = 1.
Let us call S3 the set of valuations satisfying the above-defined conditions.
In [57], S3 is used to denote the list of conditions, but this small difference in
notation should not lead to confusion here. Notice first that the conditions that
define CAV (i.e., Equations (8)–(10)), imply those that define S3, and thus are
stronger. In order to study whether S3 is a non-empty set or not, Friedman and
Glymour make further distinctions. First, they consider the normal admissible
valuations, which are those satisfying S3, plus the condition that they assign
the truth value 1 to at least one one-dimensional subspace. Again, a valuation
not satisfying this minimal requirement cannot belong to the realm of a classical
ontology. Let us denote by NS3 the set of normal valuations. Clearly, NS3 ⊆
S3. Friedman and Glymour show—by construction—that NS3 is non-empty.
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Later, they discuss whether it is possible that the valuations in S3 satisfy the
minimal physical requirement of realism that every observable have a precise
value. For this to happen, it should be the case that for every orthogonal basis,
exactly one vector receives the value true and the remainder receive the value
false. Let us call RS3 the set of normal admissible functions satisfying this
physical requirement. Notice that RS3 ⊆ NS3 ⊆ S3. Again, Friedman and
Glymour remark that RS3 is an empty set, due to the KS theorem. By the
above discussion, we also have that the conditions defining CAV (Equations
(8)–(10)) imply those of RS3, but the converse is not true.
What is left? We are only left then with the functions in NS3, that sat-
isfy the undesirable condition that some observables do not have one (and only
one) true projection operator. The whole program of having a reasonable clas-
sical valuation satisfying reasonable physical conditions is lost (due to the KS
theorem). Even so, if we only restrict to the purely mathematical entities in
NS3, G. Hellman showed in [58] that the quantum logical connectives do not
behave truth-functionally with regard to those admissible functions. One of
the admitted conclusions of Hellman’s work is that his theorem belongs to pure
mathematics, with no connection to quantum mechanics.
All roads lead to the same conclusion: it is not possible to define classical
truth-functional valuations satisfying reasonable physical requirements (in the
sense of CAV and RS3), given that the KS theorem blocks their existence. If
one gives up the minimal physical requirements of a classical ontology (using
for example, NS3), these functions will not be truth-functional either.
Some important remarks are at stake. The above discussion is related to
a well-known fact: it is possible to define local classical valuations for max-
imal Boolean subalgebras of L(H), but the Kochen-Specker theorem forbids
the existence of global ones (see sections II and III of [6]; for more discussion
on the subject, see [59, 60, 61, 62, 63]). Another related fact is that of the
non-existence of states whose range is equal to the set {0, 1} (also known as
dispersion-free states in the foundations of quantum physics literature). There
are several proofs of the non-existence of dispersion free-states, and the KS and
Gleason’s theorems can be considered among them. As far as we know, the
oldest one is due to J. von Neumann [48], and it is very important to mention
here the works of J. Bell on the subject [64, 65]. All these works involve different
assumptions and mathematical techniques. In this work, we have put the focus
on the works of Kochen and Specker, because their approach is the one best
fitting to the algebraic structures that we use in order to build the N-matrices
for quantum and generalized probabilistic models.
Indeed, if one looks carefully at the KS theorem, it is possible to recognize
that a very particular form of the principle of truth functionality fails in the
quantum realm. Namely, that there is no classical truth-value assignment v
satisfying the functionality condition given in definition 3.1 (or equivalently, the
conditions (8)–(10)). Indeed, in the KS paper [6] (see also [59]), it is proved
that this condition underlies the failure of a more general property. In order to
illustrate the idea, suppose that the observable represented by the self-adjoint
operator A has associated the real value of a. Then, the observable represented
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by A2, should have assigned the value a2. In this sense, observables are not all
independent, and neither are the values assigned to them. This gives us a clue
for understanding why truth-functionality is not valid in the quantum domain.
Following the spirit of the KS paper, let us define:
Definition 3.3. Let A(H) be the set of all self-adjoint operators acting on a
separable Hilbert space H. A function f : A(H) −→ R satisfies truth function-
ality if, for any Borel function g : A(H) −→ A(H), if g(A) is the result of
applying the function g to a self-adjoint operator A in the usual way, and fX
is the result of applying f to an arbitrary self-adjoint operator X, the condition
fg(A) = g(fA) is satisfied.
A function such as f in definition 3.3 can be called a prediction function (see
section II in [6]) because it assigns a given value to each quantum observable.
Condition
fg(A) = g(fA) , for every Borel function g, (11)
imposes a strong condition on f . Let us see how this works (see also sections
I and II in [6]). As is well known, two quantum mechanical observables repre-
sented by self-adjoint operators A and B, respectively, are compatible, if and
only if, there exist Borel functions g1 and g2, and a self adjoint operator C,
such that A = g1(C) and B = g2(C). Thus, whenever A and B are compatible,
using the functionality condition (3.3) we have fAB = fg1(C)g2(C) = f(g1g2)(C) =
(g1g2)(fC) = g1(fC)g2(fC) = fg1(C)fg2(C) = fAfB . If α and β are real num-
bers, we also have, for compatible A and B, that fαA+βB = fαg1(C)+βg2(C) =
f(αg1+βg2)(C) = (αg1 + βg2)(fC) = αg1(fC) + βg2(fC) = αfg1(C) + βfg2(C) =
αfA + βfB . It follows that f is a partial Boolean algebra homomorphism. Fur-
thermore, if P 2 = P and P † = P (i.e., if P is an orthogonal projection), we
have fP = fP 2 = fP fP = f
2
P , and then, fP = 0 or fP = 1. It should be
clear that a function with these properties cannot exist because it goes against
Proposition 3.2 (see also definition 3.1). Thus, we see that the failure of the
above described sui generis version of truth functionality (the one contained
in definition (3.3) and Equation (11)), is one of the key features of quantum
mechanics. This is true for more general probabilistic models provided that
their propositional structures admit no global classical valuations to B2 (i.e.,
provided that they do not admit valuations satisfying Equations (8)–(10)).
In the following sections, we exploit the failure of truth functionality in
quantum mechanics and import into physics the solution given by logicians to
its equivalent failure in logical systems: we will connect the semantics of N-
matrix approach in logic with the formalism of quantum mechanics.
4 Non-Deterministic Semantics
Non-deterministic multi-valued matrices (N-matrices) are a fruitful and quickly
expanding field of research introduced in [3, 4, 5] (see also [66, 67]). Since then
it has been rapidly developing towards a foundational logical theory and has
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found numerous applications [1]. The novelty of N-matrices is in extending the
usual many-valued algebraic semantics of logical systems by importing the idea
of non-deterministic computations, and allowing the truth-value of a formula to
be chosen non-deterministically out of a given set of options. N-matrices have
proved to be a powerful tool, the use of which preserves all the advantages of
ordinary many-valued matrices, but is applicable to a much wider range of logic.
Indeed, there are many useful (propositional) non-classical logics, which have no
finite multi-valued characteristic matrices, but do have finite N-matrices, and
thus are decidable.
4.1 Deterministic Matrices
Here we follow the presentation of the subject given in [1]. In what follows,
L is a propositional language and FrmL is its set of well formed formulas.
The metavariables ϕ, ψ,..., range over L-formulas, and Γ, ∆,..., over sets of
L-formulas. The standard general method for defining propositional logics is by
using (possibly many-valued) deterministic matrices:
Definition 4.1. A matrix for L is a tuple
P = 〈V ;D;O〉,
where
• V is a non-empty set of truth-values.
• D (designated truth-values) is a non-empty proper subset of V.
• For every n-ary connective ♦ of L, O includes a corresponding function
♦˜ : V n → V
A partial valuation in P is a function v to V from some subset W ⊆ FrmL
which is closed under subformulas, such that for each n-ary connective ♦ of L,
the following holds for all ψ1, ..., ψn ∈W :
v(♦(ψ1, ..., ψn)) = ♦˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn)) (12)
4.2 Non-Deterministic Matrices (N-Matrices)
Now we turn into the non-deterministic case. The main difference is that, alike
deterministic matrices, the non-deterministic ones, given the inputs in the truth
table, assign a set of possible values instead of a single one.
Definition 4.2. A non-deterministic matrix (N-matrix) for L is a tuple M =
〈V,D,O〉, where:
• V is a non-empty set of truth-values.
• D ∈ P(V ) (designated truth-values) is a non-empty proper subset of V .
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• For every n-ary connective ♦ of L, O includes a corresponding function
♦˜ : V n → P(V ) \ {∅}
Definition 4.3.
1. A partial dynamic valuation in M (or an M -legal partial dynamic valu-
ation), is a function v from some closed under subformulas subset W ⊆
FrmL to V , such that for each n-ary connective ♦ of L, the following
holds for all ψ1, ..., ψn ∈W:
v(♦(ψ1, ..., ψn)) ∈ ♦˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn)).
A partial valuation in M is called a valuation if its domain is FrmL.
2. A (partial) static valuation in M (or an M -legal (partial) static valuation),
is a (partial) dynamic valuation (defined in some W ⊆ FrmL) which
satisfies also the following composability (or functionality) principle: for
each n-ary connective ♦ of L and for every ψ1, ..., ψn, ϕ1, ..., ϕn ∈ W, if
v(ψi) = v(ϕi) (i = 1, ..., n), then
v(♦(ψ1, ..., ψn)) = v(♦(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)).
It is important to remark that ordinary (deterministic) matrices correspond
to the case when each ♦˜ : V n → V is a function taking singleton values only.
In this case there is no difference between static and dynamic valuations, and
we have full determinism.
To understand the difference between ordinary matrices and N-matrices, re-
call that in the deterministic case, the truth-value assigned by a valuation v to
a complex formula is defined as follows: v(♦(ψ1, ..., ψn)) = ♦˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn)).
Thus the truth-value assigned to ♦(ψ1, ..., ψn) is uniquely determined by the
truth-values of its subformulas: v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn). This, however, is not the case
for N-matrices: in general, the truth-values of ψ1, ..., ψn, do not uniquely deter-
mine the truth-value assigned to ♦(ψ1, ..., ψn) because different valuations hav-
ing the same truth-values for ψ1, ..., ψn can assign different elements of the set
of options ♦˜(v(ψ1), ..., v(ψn)) to ♦(ψ1, ..., ψn). Therefore the non-deterministic
semantics is non-truth-functional, as opposed to the deterministic one. Notice
also that the indeterminism that appears in the context of N-matrices is defined
in terms of the behavior of valuations, and is related to the failure of truth-
functionality. This notion should not be confused with the non-deterministic
character of quantum phenomena. Whether these notions can be connected
or not, will be the subject of future work. In Table 1, we sketch the differ-
ences between deterministic and non-deterministic matrices. Now, we review
the standard definitions of logical consequence [1].
Definition 4.4.
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Table 1: Deterministic vs. non-deterministic matrices.
Deterministic Matrices N-Matrices
Truth values set V V
Designated values set D ⊂ V D ⊂ V
Connectives ♦ ♦˜ : V n → V ♦˜ : V n → P(V ) \ {∅}
Valuations Non-dynamic Possibly dynamic and possibly non-static
Truth-Functional Yes Not necessarily
1. A (partial) valuation v in M satisfies a formula ψ (v |= ψ) if (v(ψ) is
defined and) v(ψ) ∈ D. It is a model of Γ (v |= Γ) if it satisfies every
formula in Γ.
2. We say that ψ is dynamically (statically) valid in M , in symbols |=dM ψ
(|=sM ψ), if v |= ψ for each dynamic (static) valuation v in M .
3. the dynamic (static) consequence relation induced by M is defined as fol-
lows: Γ `dM ∆ (Γ `sM ∆) if every dynamic (static) model v in M of Γ
satisfies some ψ ∈ ∆.
Obviously, the static consequence relation includes the dynamic one, i.e.,
`dM⊆`sM . For ordinary matrices, we have `sM=`dM .
Theorem 4.5. Let M be a two-valued N-matrix which has at least one proper
non-deterministic operation. Then there is no finite family of finite ordinary
matrices F such that `dM ψ iff `F ψ.
Theorem 4.6. For every (finite) N-matrix M, there is a (finite) family of or-
dinary matrices F such that `sM=`F .
Thus, only the expressive power of the dynamic semantics based on N-
matrices is stronger than that of ordinary matrices.
5 N-Matrices for Probabilistic Theories
As we have seen in Section 3, the Kochen-Specker theorem forbids the exis-
tence of a homomorphism (i.e., valuations satisfying Equations (8)–(10)) from
the lattice of quantum propositions to the two-valued algebra B2. There, we
showed how one of the most important presuppositions of the Kochen-Specker
contradiction can be related to the logical notion of truth functionality. Weaker
versions of admissible valuations also fail to give a truth-functional system. This
is the case, for example, of the valuations contained in the set NS3. Given that
valuations in a semantics-based in non-deterministic matrices are not, in gen-
eral, truth-functional, they could provide an interesting way of describing those
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formal aspects of quantum theory related to Kochen–Specker-like contextual-
ity. Thus, given that quantum states cannot be interpreted in terms of classical
(deterministic) valuations (i.e., valuations in CAV ), in this section we aim to
describe them as valuations of a non-deterministic semantics. It turns out that
there are several ways to associate non-deterministic matrices to the quantum
formalism. Furthermore, we show that quantum states can be described as val-
uations associated with a very particular form of non-deterministic truth tables.
5.1 Construction of the N-Matrices for the Quantum For-
malism
In this section, we build the canonical N-matrices of the quantum formalism. We
use the lattice of propositions L(H) appearing in (4) and the physical constraints
imposed by the properties of quantum states, in such a way that the valuations
defined by our matrices are exactly those given by quantum states. Let V = [0, 1]
and D = {1}. A proposition will be true if and only if its valuation yields the
value 1, and it is false for any other value (this is connected to the standard
quantum logical notion of truth; see discussion in [27]). In order to build the
matrices, we take into account first that for every state µ, whenever P⊥Q, we
have µ(P ∨ Q) = µ(P ) + µ(Q) (this follows from (4)). Let us now study the
disjunction function ∨˜ : V × V → P(V ) \ {∅}. From the Equation (4), it is easy
to check that max(µ(P ), µ(Q)) ≤ µ(P ∨Q) ≤ 1. In terms of valuations (denoted
generically by v), this can be written as
max(v(P ), v(Q)) ≤ v(P ∨Q) ≤ 1.
In this way, the natural candidate for the disjunction matrix is given by
P Q ∨˜
if P ⊥ Q a b {a+ b}
if P 6⊥ Q a b [max(a, b); 1]
(13)
Let us now turn to the functions associated to the conjunction. They have
to be of the form ∧˜ : V ×V → P(V )\{∅}. Proceeding as before, we obtain that
valuations should satisfy
v(P ∧Q) ≤ min(v(P ), v(Q)).
Thus, whenever a valuation v(· · · ) assigns v(P ) = a and v(Q) = b (a, b ∈ V ),
it is reasonable to define the following N-matrix:
P Q ∧˜
if P 6⊥ Q a b [0,min(a, b)]
if P ⊥ Q a b {0}.
(14)
Notice that in the tables (13) and (14) the connectives “∨” and “∧” are
defined by parts, in the sense that we distinguish between their restrictions
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to the case of orthogonal vs. non-orthogonal input propositions. Formally
speaking, this means that each Table describes the functions associated with
two partially defined connectives (each line of each Table defines a function
associated with a partially defined connective).
It remains to give the table for the negation ¬˜ : V → P(V ) \ {∅}. The most
natural candidate compatible with the properties of quantum states (4) is given
by ¬˜(a) = {1− a}, and then
P ¬˜
a {1− a} (15)
This is a deterministic negation, in the sense that its interpretation set is a
singleton, which is a function of a.
The above three tables (considered together) impose the restrictions for all
possible valuations. A closer look at them reveals that for finite-dimensional
models they contain the very conditions of Gleason’s theorem. Thus, the only
valuations that satisfy them (for finite-dimensional models) are those defined
by quantum states. Let us see how this is so. First, notice that any quantum
state will satisfy the three tables. Thus, the set of quantum states is contained
in the set of valuations defined by the above tables. Conversely, suppose that a
given valuation v satisfies the three tables. As a valuation, it will take values in
the interval [0, 1]. In order to see that condition 1 of (4) is valid, let us first take
two arbitrary orthogonal one-dimensional projections P and Q. Since they are
orthogonal, using the truth-table of the conjunction, we have v(P ∧Q) = 0. On
the other hand, given that P ∧Q = 0 (since they are orthogonal), we conclude
that v(0) = v(P ∧ Q) = 0, which is condition 1 of (4). It is also important
to remark that if P ≤ Q, then P ∨ Q = Q and, using 13 for the case P 6⊥ Q
(when P 6= 0), it follows that v(Q) = v(P ∨ Q) ≥ max(v(P ), v(Q)) ≥ v(P ).
Thus, it easily follows that any valuation compatible with the above tables will
be order preserving. When P ⊥ Q, we have P ≤ Q⊥, and then, v(P ) ≤ v(Q⊥).
Using 15, this can be rewritten as v(P ) ≤ 1 − v(Q). Thus, it follows that for
P ⊥ Q, v(P ) + v(Q) ≤ 1 (notice that, in the first line of 13, we could have set
{min(a+b, 1)} instead of the simpler expression {a+b}; but since v(P )+v(Q) ≤
1 for all v, this is not necessary). Whenever two orthogonal projections are given,
due to the truth-table of the disjunction, we have v(P ∨Q) = v(P ) + v(Q). For
finite-dimensional models, this is equivalent to condition 3 in (4). Condition 2
of (4) is automatically satisfied due to the truth table of the negation. Thus,
we have proved that any valuation satisfying the three tables also satisfies the
axioms of quantum states (for finite-dimensional models), and then, it has to be
a quantum state. In other words, we have that, for finite-dimensional models,
the only valuations that satisfy the above non-deterministic truth-tables are the
quantum states (i.e., those states defined by density matrices).
For infinite-dimensional models of quantum systems, one could still try to
impose a σ-additivity condition (such as the one appearing in (4)), and apply
again Gleason’s theorem to obtain quantum states. This involves the use of a
condition on a denumerable set of propositions. We will study this possibility
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in a future work. It is also important to remark that there are generalized
versions of Gleason’s theorem [68] that can be used to study additive (and not
necessarily σ-additive) measures, and could be an interesting subject of study
in future works.
One last thing remains. According to the above-defined tables, we may ask:
are the above tables truth-functional with regard to the quantum logical connec-
tives? To begin with, notice that the negation table is classical. More concretely:
is it true that for every two propositions P and Q, and every quantum logical
connective , if the probabilities assigned to P and are a and b, respectively,
the value of the probability of P  Q is determined by a and b? This question
is tricky, because, even if the valuations are valued into sets with more than
one element, Gleason’s theorem could impose, in principle, restrictions in such
a way that all states that assign probabilities a and b to P and Q, respectively,
assign the same value for the composed proposition P Q. This is explicitly the
case when P ⊥ Q: for all ρ ∈ S(H), if tr(ρP ) = a and tr(ρP ) = b, we have that
tr(ρ(P ∨Q)) = a+ b and tr(ρ(P ∧Q)) = 0. It turns out that this is not the case
when P 6⊥ Q, as the following examples show.
Consider first a four dimensional quantum model and the basis {|a〉, |b〉, |c〉, |d〉}.
Consider the propositions defined by the projection operators P = |a〉〈a| +
|b〉〈b| and Q = |b〉〈b| + |c〉〈c|. Clearly, R := P ∧ Q = |b〉〈b| and P 6⊥ Q.
We chose for simplicity α, β, γ, δ ∈ R and consider the state |ψ〉 = √α|a〉 +√
β|b〉 + √γ|c〉 + √δ|d〉. Thus, the probabilities of the elements of the basis
are given by α, β, δ and γ, respectively, and the normalization condition reads
α + β + γ + δ = 1. A simple calculation yields that the probability of P is
pψ(P ) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|P ) = α + β, the probability of Q is pψ(Q) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|Q) =
β + γ and the probability of R is pψ(P ∧ Q) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|(P ∧ Q)) = β. Now,
chose 0 < ε < α, β, γ, δ, and consider a new quantum state defined by |ψε〉 =
(
√
α+ ε|a〉 + √β − ε|b〉 + √γ + ε|c〉 + √δ − ε|d〉 (the reader can easily check
that the normalization is correct). Now, we have that the probability of P
is pψε(P ) = tr(|ψε〉〈ψε|P ) = α + ε + β − ε = α + β, the probability of Q is
pψε(Q) = tr(|ψε〉〈ψε|Q) = β − ε + γ + ε = β + γ and the probability of R is
pψε(P ∧ Q)) = tr(|ψε〉〈ψε|(P ∧ Q) = β − ε 6= β. Thus, we have two different
states that assign the same probabilities to P and Q, but different values to
P ∧Q.
With the same notation as in the previous example, we have that S :=
P ∨ Q = |a〉〈a| + |b〉〈b| + |c〉〈c|. Again, we have P 6⊥ Q, pψ(P ) = α + β and
pψ(Q) = β + γ. For the disjunction, we now have pψ(P ∨ Q) = tr(|ψ〉〈ψ|(P ∨
Q)) = α + β + γ. Computing the probabilities for state |ψε〉, we obtain again
pψε(P ) = α+β and pψε(Q) = β+γ. The probability of the disjunction is given
by pψε(P∨Q) = tr(|ψε〉〈ψε|(P∨Q) = α+ε+β−ε+γ+ε = α+β+γ+ε 6= α+β+γ.
Thus, we have two different states that assign the same probabilities to P and
Q, but different values to P ∨Q.
These examples show that the truth tables defined above define a strictly
non-deterministic semantics: the valuations which are compatible with those
tables are dynamic. Are they static? The following example shows that this is
not the case.
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Consider a three dimensional Hilbert space with a basis {|a〉, |b〉, |c〉}. Define
P = |a〉〈a| and Q = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| (where |ϕ〉 = 1√
2
(|a〉 + |b〉))). The conjunction is
given by P ∨ Q = |a〉〈a| + |b〉〈b| (due to the fact that they are two linearly
independent vectors, they define a closed subspace of dimension 2). Consider
the state |φ〉 = |b〉. Thus, we have pφ(P ) = tr(|b〉〈b|a〉〈a|) = 0, pφ(Q) = 12
and pφ(P ∨ Q) = tr(|b〉〈b|(P ∨ Q)) = tr(|b〉〈b|(|a〉〈a| + |b〉〈b|)) = 1. Consider
now P ′ = |c〉〈c| and Q′ = Q. We again have pφ(P ′) = tr(|b〉〈b|c〉〈c|) = 0 and
pφ(Q
′) = 12 . The disjunction is given by P
′ ∨ Q′ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| + |c〉〈c| (we are
using that |c〉 and |ϕ〉 are orthogonal). Now, pφ(P ′ ∨ Q′) = tr(|b〉〈b|(|ϕ〉〈ϕ| +
|c〉〈c|)) = tr(|b〉〈b|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) + tr(|b〉〈b|c〉〈c| = 12 + 0 = 12 6= 1. Thus, we have
obtained that, given two pairs of propositions, P and Q, and P ′ and Q′, there
is a valuation vφ(...) = tr(|φ〉〈φ|(...)) (induced by the quantum state |φ〉), that
satisfies vφ(P ) = vφ(P
′), vφ(Q) = vφ(Q′), but vφ(P ∨Q) 6= vφ(P ′ ∨Q′). Thus,
in general, the valuations will not be static. Thus, the valuations defined by
quantum states will not be static in general.
In Table 2, we summarize the differences between the classical and quantum
cases.
Table 2: Table comparing the different valuations that can be defined on classical
vs. quantum propositional systems.
Classical systems Quantum systems
Lattice Boolean Algebra Projections lattice
Truth-tables Admit deterministic matrices Only proper N-matrices
Truth-Values Admit valuations in {0, 1} Only valuations in [0, 1]
Truth-Functional Yes (for deterministic states) No
Satisfy Adequacy Yes (for deterministic states) No
5.2 The General Case
In this section, we turn into the non-deterministic matrices for generalized prob-
abilistic models, whose propositional structures are defined by arbitrary com-
plete orthomodular lattices and states are defined by Equation (7). We proceed
in a similar way to that of the quantum case, but it is important to take into
account that now (a) Gleason’s theorem will no longer be available in many
models, and (b) the difference between additivity and σ-additivity imposes a
great restriction if one wants to link valuations with states (see [68] for general-
izations of Gleason’s theorem and the discussion about the difference between
additivity and σ-additivity). In the general case, it will be possible to affirm
that every state defines a valuation, but there will exist valuations which are no
states. Furthermore, if the lattice admits no states [69], then the matrices that
we define will admit no valuations at all.
It is also very important to remark that the N-matrices introduced below,
work well when the lattices are Boolean algebras. This means that classical
(Kolmogorovian) probabilistic models (defined by Equation (6)) also fall into
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our scheme. Indeed, following a similar procedure to the one of the preceding
section, it is possible to check that the N-matrices associated with a classical
probabilistic model are strictly non-deterministic. A similar conclusion can be
reached from the point of view of multi-valued logics [70]. Alike the quan-
tum case, classical probabilistic models always admit global classical valuations
whose range is equal to the set {0, 1} (i.e., they admit valuations obeying Equa-
tions (8)–(10)). If the requirements of physics are satisfied, due to the KS
and Gleason’s theorems, the range of global valuations associated with the N-
matrices associated with quantum systems cannot be equal to {0, 1}. A similar
observation holds for more general probabilistic models, provided that they are
contextual enough and they admit states.
Let us first build the interpretation set for the conjunction function ∧˜ :
V × V → P(V ) \ {∅}. Using Equation (7), it easily follows that µ(p ∧ q) ≤
min(µ(p), µ(q)). Remember also that, in the general setting, p ⊥ q iff p ≤ q⊥
(or equivalently, q ≤ p⊥), where (...)⊥ is the orthocomplementation in L (see
[56], Chapter 1). Thus, whenever a valuation v(· · · ) assigns v(p) = a and
v(q) = b (a, b ∈ V ), the natural truth table for the conjunction can be given by:
p q ∧˜
if p 6⊥ q a b [0,min(a, b)]
if p ⊥ q a b {0}
(16)
Let us now study the disjunction function ∨˜ : V ×V → P(V )\{∅}. Using (7),
we obtain max(µ(p), µ(q)) ≤ µ(p ∨ q) ≤ 1 and max(v(p), v(q)) ≤ v(p ∨ q) ≤ 1.
Thus, the truth-table is given by:
p q ∨˜
If p⊥q a b {a+ b}
if p 6⊥ q a b [max(a, b); 1]
(17)
In the general setting, the negation of a proposition a is represented by its
orthogonal complement “a⊥” in the lattice. In order to impose restrictions on
valuations, we use (7) (in the following section, we will consider more general
possibilities). Thus, we define ¬˜(a) = {1− a} and obtain:
p ¬˜
a {1− a} (18)
6 Other Logical Aspects of Our Construction
In this section, we turn into other logical aspects of the quantum N-matrices.
We start by discussing the notion of adequacy and introduce variants of the
deterministic negation defined by (15). Next, we discuss how they behave un-
der the application of double negation. Finally, we discuss the notion of logical
consequence defined by the quantum N-matrices. As is well known, the inclu-
sion relationship between projection operators is not—from a logical point of
view—a true implication. By constructing a suitable N-matrix semantics for
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the quantum formalism, we would obtain the benefits of the notion of logical
consequence developed by Avron and Zamansky [1]. One of the most important
advantages of the N-matrix system is that, given that it is usually represented
by finite matrices, it is possible to prove its decidability. In our approach—in
order to obtain a closer connection with the quantum formalism—we assumed
that V is non-denumerable. We show below that it is always possible to re-
duce the cardinality of V to that of a denumerable set, without affecting the
set of theorems. This is directly related to the definitions of F-expansion and
refinement (6.2).
6.1 Quantum N-Matrices and Adequacy
Let us now turn to the notion of adequacy of N-matrices:
Definition 6.1. Let M = 〈V,D,O〉 be an N-matrix for a language which in-
cludes the positive fragment of the classical logic (LK+). We say that M is
adequate for this language, in case that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. ∧˜:
If a ∈ D and b ∈ D, then a∧˜b ⊆ D
If a 6∈ D, then a∧˜b ⊆ V \D
If b 6∈ D, then a∧˜b ⊆ V \D
2. ∨˜:
If a ∈ D, then a∨˜b ⊆ D
If b ∈ D, then a∨˜b ⊆ D
If a 6∈ D and b 6∈ D, then a∨˜b ⊆ V \D
3. ⊃˜:
If a 6∈ D, then a⊃˜b ⊆ D
If b ∈ D, then a⊃˜b ⊆ D
If a ∈ D and b 6∈ D, then a⊃˜b ⊆ V \D
In this section we briefly discuss definition 6.1 in the context of quantum
generalized N-matrices with finite precision measurements. By this, we mean a
situation in which it is not possible to determine if a proposition is true, but
it is possible to assure that it is included within a certain interval around 1.
In order to do this, we can now take the same tables defined by (13)–(15) (or
equivalently, (17), (16) and (18) for the general case), and change the designated
values set to D = [α, 1], with α ∈ (0, 1]. By setting α = 1, we obtain the matrices
of the previous sections.
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It is important to remark that with an interpretation set such as D = [α, 1]
and tables defined by (13)–(15) (or (17), (16) and (18)), it could be the case
that a valuation selects a non-designated value, even when both input elements
are designated (notice that this is also true for the case α = 1). Let us illustrate
this with an example. Suppose that α = 1 and we prepare a quantum system in
a state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉) with 〈ψ1|ψ2〉 = 0. Thus, the valuation associated
to the state ρψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, assigns non-designated values to the propositions
|ψ1〉〈ψ1| and |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, while it assigns a designated value to the proposition
|ψ1〉〈ψ1| + |ψ2〉〈ψ2| (associated to the disjunction |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and |ψ2〉〈ψ2|). This
makes our matrix non-adequate because it violates condition 2 of definition 6.1.
Thus, in general, quantum states will not satisfy adequacy. Adequacy is not a
requirement for physics, but it could be of interest to logicians. For example, it
is possible to use the criterion of definition 6.1 to give unicity proofs for matrices
given a certain language and conditions. Thus, let us see what can we do in
order to obtain an adequate matrix. We must first restrict the interpretation
set of the conjunction. Notice that, by doing this, we depart from physics, given
that the new valuations may no longer be quantum states.
Let us start by defining the interpretation set for the conjunction ∧˜ : V ×V →
P(V )\{∅}. As before, a and b represent the respective values for the valuations
of p and q: v(p) = a and v(q) = b. Let us discuss case by case.
• If a, b ∈ D:
Given that 0 ≤ v(p ∧ q) ≤ min(a, b), this suggests us to take the interpre-
tation set for the conjunction for the case where both values are designated
as:
a∧˜b ⊆ [0,min(a, b)] ∩D (19)
• If a ∈ D, and b 6∈ D
Proceeding similarly as before, we obtain v(p ∧ q) ≤ min(a, b), but now we
know which is the smallest between a and b, given that b is not designated.
Thus,
0 ≤ v(p ∧ q) ≤ b
This suggests the following interpretation:
a∧˜b ⊆ [0, b] ⊆ V \D. (20)
It is easy to check that this case satisfies the adequacy criterion without the
necessity of restricting the set.
The case a 6∈ D and b ∈ D is totally analogous.
• If a, b 6∈ D:
Given that
0 ≤ v(p ∧ q) ≤ min(a, b), thus
a∧˜b ⊆ [0,min(a, b)] ⊆ V \D. (21)
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Proceeding in an analogous way, we now obtain the interpretation set of the
disjunction:
∨˜ : V 2 → 2V \ {∅}
• If a, b ∈ D
Given that p ≤ p∨ q and q ≤ p∨ q, then µ(p) ≤ µ(p∨ q) and µ(q) ≤ µ(p∨ q).
a ≤ v(p ∨ q) and b ≤ v(p ∨ q), thus
max(a, b) ≤ v(p ∨ q) ≤ 1
Thus,
a∨˜b ⊆ [max(a, b), 1] ⊆ D (22)
• If a ∈ D, b 6∈ D or a 6∈ D, b ∈ D
a∨˜b ⊆ [max(a, b), 1] ⊆ D (23)
• If a, b 6∈ D
If none of the two terms has a designated value, one possibility is to proceed
as in the first case with the conjunction (by restricting our set in such a way
that it satisfies the adequacy criterium).
a∨˜b ⊆ [max(a, b), 1]
A valuation for two projections with non-designated values could give us a
designated value. If we want to avoid this, and using Avron’s criterion, the
interpretation set should be:
a∨˜b ⊆ [max(a, b), 1] ∩ (V \D). (24)
We will not follow this choice, given that Gleason’s theorem imposes stronger
restrictions on valuations.
Let us turn now to the negation. We consider different choices, alternative to
(18). Given that we are working with orthomodular lattices, we have that any
state satisfies µ(p⊥) = 1 − µ(p). In terms of valuations, this condition reads:
v(p⊥) = 1 − v(p). In order to obtain a non-deterministic negation, our first
choice is:
Case 1:
p ¬˜1
a ∈ D [0, 1− a]
a 6∈ D [1− a, 1]
(25)
This case generalizes the standard quantum one (given by (15)), leaving 1−a
(deterministic negation) as a respective bound.
Case 2: We introduce parameters now. Let us assume that α ∈ ( 12 , 1) and
define:
p ¬˜2
a ∈ D [α− a2 ( 1−αα ), α)
a 6∈ D [α, α+ a2 ( 1−αα )]
(26)
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Both sets depend now on the value of α.
Finally, by appealing to (15) and (18), we can always define deterministic
negations. This is perhaps the more natural choice for the standard quan-
tum case and more general probabilistic models. In this case, independently of
whether the value of a is designated or not, the negation yields 1−a. If we take
D = {1} as in the standard quantum logical case, then the negation of a given
designed value would give a non-designed result. The converse is not necessarily
true.
6.2 Double Negation
Now we turn to some problems that could emerge with the behavior of the
double negation. A more detailed study of the negation and double negation
is left for future work. We consider both, logical and physical motivations in
order to proceed.
Given its relation to the orthogonal complement in Hilbert spaces, it is de-
sirable that the negation satisfies the principle of double negation. It is obvious
that the negations defined in (15) and (18) satisfy this principle. We now show
that, despite of not respecting this principle strictly, the negation ¬˜1 (see (25))
has a very particular behavior that could be related to the classical limit be-
tween logics. Although the negations defined by (25) and (26) do not behave
properly in this sense, their existence is interesting on its own, given that, in
a different domain, we may need different types of connectives associated with
the negation. As an example, in quantum circuits, it is possible to define an
operation which is the square root of the negation. It is important to remark
that the failure of double negation is also found in other algebraic structures
associated with the quantum formalism (see for example [71]).
Let us now analyze the double negation for ¬˜1. Applying it twice, we obtain:
v((¬1(¬1(p))) ∈ ¬˜1(v(¬1p))
v(¬1p) ∈ ¬˜1(v(p))
Let us analyze the different cases in relation to the set of designated values.
We assume that 0.5 < α.
• If v(p) = a ∈ D = [α, 1]:
¬˜1(a) = [0, 1− a] and v(¬1p) ∈ [0, 1− a]
Let b = v(¬1p) ∈ [0, 1− a] ⊆ (V \D). Then:
v(¬1(¬1p)) ∈ ¬˜1(b) = [1− b, 1],
given that b is not a designated value. Thus, the double negation maps desig-
nated values to designated values. If we order all possible values, then:
0 ≤ b ≤ 1− a ≤ α ≤ a ≤ 1− b ≤ 1
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This proves that, after taking two times the negation of a designated value,
the value for the double negation must be chosen out of a set which is included
in the set from which the original designated value was taken. This means that,
when taking consecutively the double negation for the designated case, the lower
bound of the final interpretation set for the connective is closer to {1}. Now we
show that this will not happen if we start from a non-designated value.
• If v(p) = a 6∈ D
¬˜1(a) = [1− a, 1]
Let b be the value that the valuation takes inside this set:
b = v(¬1p) ∈ [1− a, 1]
Then, we obtain
v(¬1(¬1p)) ∈ ¬˜1(b)
The difference with regard to the previous case is that now b could be a
designated value or not, given that inside the interval [1 − a, 1], in principle,
there could be values of both types. As an example, if α = 0.9 and a = 0.8,
the involved interval would be [0.2, 1], which contains both designed and non-
designed values. Thus, for the double negation, in this case, we have to separate
the interpretation set depending on the type of value taken by b.
This behavior was already included in the orthodox quantum logical treat-
ment, where the negation of a true proposition was false, but the negation of
something false is not necessarily true. Thus, we obtain:
v(¬1(¬1p)) ∈ ¬˜1(b)
with:
¬˜1(b) =
{
[0, 1− b] b ∈ D
[1− b, 1] b 6∈ D
This means that the application of the double negation many times not
necessarily has as a consequence a concentration of the values of the valuation
around 0.
A similar analysis can be made for the second negation presented in this
work, and the conclusion—though not identical—goes in the same direction.
The principle of double negation is not satisfied either.
6.3 Quantum N-Matrix as a Refinement of an F-Expansion
of a Finite N-Matrix
In this section, we make use of the following definition (presented in [72]):
Definition 6.2. Let M1 = 〈V1, D1, O1〉 and M2 = 〈V2, D2, O2〉 be N-matrices
for L.
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1. M1 is a refinement of M2 if V1 ⊆ V2, D1 = D2∩V1, and ♦˜M1(x) ⊆ ♦˜M2(x)
for every n-ary conective ♦ of L and every tuple x ∈ V n1 .
2. Let F be a function that assigns to each x ∈ V a non-empty set F (x),
such that F (x1) ∩ F (x2) = ∅ if x1 6= x2. The F -expansion of M1 is the
following N-matrix MF1 = 〈VF , DF , OF 〉, with VF =
⋃
x∈V F (x), DF =⋃
x∈D F (x), and ♦˜MF1 (y1, ..., yn) =
⋃
z∈♦˜M1 (x1,...,xn) F (z) whenever ♦ is
an n-ary connective of L, and xi ∈ V , yi ∈ F (xi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We say that M2 is an expansion of M1 if M2 is the F -expansion of M1
for some function F .
We now show that the N-matrix constructed for the orthomodular lattice
of projection operators for the case of D = 1 is a particular refinement of
an F-expansion of a finite N-matrix. We will not consider the case with more
designated values. In order to reach this aim, we must give first some definitions
with regard to expansions and refinements. For a more detailed treatment of
the techniques used in this section (and proofs and propositions), we refer the
reader to [73].
We say that M2 is a simple refinement of M1, if it is a refinement (definition
(6.2)) and it satisfies V1 = V2. Given a function F , let Im(F ) and Dom(F )
denote the image and domain of F , respectively. For every expansion function
F and y ∈ ⋃ Im(F ), we denote by F˜ [y] the unique element x ∈ Dom(F ) such
that y ∈ F (x).
Definition 6.3. Let M1 = 〈V1, D1, O1〉 and M2 = 〈V2, D2, O2〉 be N-matrices
and F an expansion function for M1. We say M2 is an F-rexpansion of M1 if
it is a refinement of the F-expansion of M1. It is called:
1. simple if it is a simple refinement of the F-expansion of M1.
2. preserving if F (x) ∩ V2 6= ∅ for every x ∈ V1.
3. strongly preserving if it is preserving, and for every x1, ..., xn ∈ V2, ♦ ∈
♦nL and y ∈ ♦˜1(F˜ [x1], ..., F˜ [xn]), it holds that the set F (y)∩♦˜2(x1, ..., xn)
is not empty.
Loosely speaking, being a preserving rexpansion amounts to keeping at least
one “copy” of every original truth-value. Being strongly preserving means that
this property holds not only for the set of truth-values, but also for the inter-
pretation of the connectives.
Proposition 6.4. Every simple rexpansion is preserving, every expansion is a
strongly preserving rexpansion, and every preserving rexpansion of a matrix is
strongly preserving.
The proof can be found in [73].
Proposition 6.5. The N-matrix M2 = 〈V2, D2, O2〉 is a rexpansion of the N-
matrix M1 = 〈V1, D1, O1〉 iff there is a function f : V2 → V1 such that:
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1. For every x ∈ V2, x ∈ D2 iff f(x) ∈ D1.
2. For every x1, ..., xn ∈ V2 and y ∈ ♦˜2(x1, ..., xn), it holds that f(y) ∈
♦˜1(f(x1), ..., f(xn)).
Proposition 6.6. If M2 is a rexpansion of M1 then `M1⊆`M2 . Moroever, if
M2 is strongly preserving, then `M1=`M2 .
Now we proceed to find a finite N-matrix of which our quantum N-matrix is
an expansion. This N-matrix will not be unique, given that there exist infinitely
many rexpansions for a given N-matrix, and each matrix can be the rexpansion
of different N-matrices. Each one of these rexpansions is compromised with
different expansion functions and different degrees of refinement. Once one of
these N-matrixes is found, it is possible to use Proposition (6.6) in order to
relate the sets of theorems.
Let V2 = [0, 1], V1 = {t, T, F}, D2 = {1} and f : V2 → V1, such that
f(1) = t; f(0) = F ; f(α) = T, α ∈ (0, 1)
In this case, we aim to find a finite N-matrix of three values, in such a way
that the quantum N-matrix be its expansion. We then propose an N-matrix of
two values.
Applying item 1 of proposition (6.5): x ∈ {1} iff f(x) ∈ D1 ⇒ D1 = {t}.
Now we apply item 2 of Proposition (6.5) in order to find the interpretation
set for each connective.
∀x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1], y ∈ ∨˜Q(x1, x2) = [max(x1, x2), 1]⇒ f(y) ∈ ∨˜1(f(x1), f(x2))
If x1 = x2 = 0, then y ∈ [0, 1]⇒ f(y) ∈ ∨˜1(f(0), f(0)). Thus,
∨˜1(F, F ) = {t, T, F} (27)
If x1 = x2 = 1,
y ∈ ∨˜Q(1, 1) = [max(1, 1), 1] = {1} ⇒ f(1) ∈ ∨˜1(t, t).
Then,
∨˜1(t, t) = {t} (28)
If x1 = 0, x2 = α;α ∈ (0, 1), y ∈ [α, 1]⇒ f(y) ∈ ∨˜1(F, T ).
∨˜1(F, T ) = {t, T} (29)
By following this procedure, it is possible to find all the elements of the
interpretation set of the conjunction. The following table resumes all the results
of a possible candidate:
∨˜1 t T F
t {t} {t} {t}
T {t} {t, T} {t, T}
F {t} {t, T} {t, T, F}
(30)
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It is important to remark that the interpretation set for the disjunction is one
of several possibilities. That in this case, we are not imposing the constrains
related to Gleason’s theorem. In the same way, it is possible to find the set
corresponding to the conjunction. The results are shown in the following table:
∧˜1 t T F
t {t, T, F} {F, T} {F}
T {T, F} {T, F} {F}
F {F} {F} {F}
(31)
For the negation, we have:
t T F
¬˜1 {F} {T} {t} (32)
For the above table we have taken the standard negation associated to the
lattice.
If V1 = {t, F} is chosen as the initial set (instead of V1 = {t, T, F}), it is possible
to proceed as follows:
f : V2 → V1
such that f(1) = t, f(α) = F and α ∈ [0, 1). Proceeding in an analogous way
as before, we arrive at the following table:
∨˜1 t F
t {t} {t}
F {t} {t, F}
(33)
and a similar procedure can be applied to the rest of the connectives.
7 Conclusions
In this work we have seen that:
• There are several ways in which one can affirm that the quantum formalism
does not obey truth functionality.
• The set of projection operators admits N-matrices, and thus, the N-
matrices formalism can be adapted to quantum mechanics.
• Each quantum state can be interpreted as a valuation associated to a
non-deterministic semantics. Indeed, the set of quantum states can be
characterized as being equivalent to the set of valuations defined by the
N-matrices that we propose in section 5. We have proved that quantum
states, considered as valuations, are, in general, dynamic and non-static.
We have provided a similar analysis for generalized probabilistic models.
• There exist different candidates for non-deterministic semantics which are
compatible with the quantum formalism. We have studied different ex-
amples.
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• It is possible to give a notion of a logical consequence associated to non-
deterministic semantics in the quantum formalism (a study that should
be extended, of course, in future work).
We think that the constructions presented here can open the door to inter-
esting questions in both, the fields of quantum mechanics and logic. On the
physics side, it opens the door to studying axioms for generalized probabilistic
systems using logical axioms. On the logical side, it gives place to a new model
of N-matrices with possible physical applications.
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